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  hen dealing with questions relating to the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles, it should be noted at the outset that the Arbitral Tribunal in 
the arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 2006 pointed 
out that “there is in law only a single continental shelf rather than an inner 
shelf and a separate or outer continental shelf.”1 This was confirmed by the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2012 in the 
Bangladesh v. Myanmar case, stating that Article 76 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)2 embodies the concept of a 
single continental shelf over which the coastal State exercises exclusive 
sovereign rights in its entirety without any distinction being made between 
the shelf within 200 nautical miles and the shelf beyond that limit.3 Article 
83 UNCLOS, dealing with the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
States with opposite or adjacent coasts, likewise makes no distinction.4 This 
position has since been generally accepted by international courts and 
tribunals. 
Despite the fact that there is “in law” only a single continental shelf, 
there is, nevertheless, an important difference in the legal obligations of 
States Parties between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical 
miles. According to Article 82 UNCLOS, there are obligations of coastal 
States, which are only applicable beyond that distance.5 These obligations 
relate to revenue sharing for the benefit of the international community by 
coastal States in the form of “payments or contributions in kind in respect 
of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.”6 
                                                 
1. Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (Barb. v. 
Trin. & Tobago), 27 R.I.A.A. 147, 208–9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006). 
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
3. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment, Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 
4, 96, ¶ 361 [hereinafter Bangladesh v. Myanmar]. 
4. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 83. 
5. Id. art. 82. 















Proposals made at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (the Conference) to limit the legal continental shelf to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured and to subsume it under the concept of the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) did not find general agreement. The attempts by the 
African Group, as well as by the Group of Landlocked and Geographically 
Disadvantaged States,7 failed because the doctrine of the continental shelf as 
set out in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf8 and 
reinforced in 1969 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases9 was already quite firmly anchored in international 
law,10 except for a clear definition of the outer limits. The States with broad 
continental shelves therefore saw no reason to compromise on this issue. 
The creation of the EEZ, recognizing the right of coastal States to 
jurisdiction over the resources of some 85 million square kilometers of ocean 
space,11 covering approximately 36 percent of the surface of the seas and 
accounting for almost 90 percent of fisheries, has been called one of the 
most revolutionary features of UNCLOS.12 This assessment, however, 
somewhat underestimates the importance of the evolution of the concept of 
the continental shelf, which had previously generally been considered “a 
shallow-water offshore plain area.”13 In view of the proliferation of claims 
                                                 
7. See also 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A 
COMMENTARY 843–48 (Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne & Neal R. Grandy eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY]. 
8. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. 
9. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3, ¶ 63 (Feb. 20). 
10. See also Stephen Vasciannie, Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States and the 
Question of the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 58 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 271, 272 (1987). 
11. Michael W. Lodge, Implementation of the Common Heritage of Mankind, in REGIONS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND LAW OF THE SEA 129, 136 n.21 (Harry N. Scheiber & Jin-Hyun Paik 
eds., 2013). 
12. Gunnar Kullenberg, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Some Perspectives, 42 OCEAN AND 
COASTAL MANAGEMENT 849, 855 (1999). 
13. Yuri Kasmin, Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 













by coastal States to the resources of the continental shelf following the 1945 
Truman Proclamation, which had been motivated by the long-range 
worldwide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals,14 the 
adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention can, despite its undeniable 
flaws, be considered a certain progress, at least by assuring some degree of 
legal stability. Article 1 defined the continental shelf as the “seabed and 
subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the 
territorial sea” and set forth two criteria for determining its outer limit: one 
based on water depth of 200 meters and the other on the notion of resource 
exploitability beyond that limit.15 
That Convention only received a limited number of ratifications as many 
States did not agree with the open-ended exploitability criterion, which also 
rendered the depth criterion practically useless. The acceptance by the ICJ 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of Article 1 as part of customary 
international law16 therefore seems rather bold. Shortly after that judgment, 
the U.N. General Assembly “considered that the definition of the 
continental shelf as contained in the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf…does not define with sufficient precision the limits of that area” and 
that “customary international law on the subject is inconclusive.”17 The ICJ 
in 1969 had also decided that the continental shelf constituted a “natural 
prolongation” of “a coastal State’s land territory into and under the sea.”18 
In this connection, it should be remembered that the Court employed the 
term “natural prolongation” to justify the appurtenance of the continental 
shelf to the coastal States and not to clarify its outer limits.19 Many States, 
however, thereafter equated the concept of “natural prolongation” with the 
                                                 
Continental Shelf 3 (May 1, 2000), https://www.un.org/depts//los/clcs_new/ 
documents/CLCS_26.pdf. 
14. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil 
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 
28, 1945). 
15. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 8, art. 1. See Kevin A. Baumert, 
The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf under Customary International Law, 111 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 827, 829 (2018). 
16. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 9, ¶ 63. 
17. G.A. Res. 2574 (XXIV) A, pmbl., para. 3 (Dec. 15, 1969). 
18. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 9, ¶ 39. 
19. Barbara Kwiatkowska, Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Light of the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice, 22 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND 













notion of the continental margin, that is, the geophysical shelf, the slope, and 
the rise,20 a view that would later find its way into UNCLOS. 
 
III. UNCLOS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
 
The protracted and extremely complicated negotiations at the Conference 
lasted from 1974 to 1982. The current provisions of Article 76 UNCLOS 
were accepted as a compromise, despite serious misgivings of many States. 
There were three major reasons for the opposition of States to national 
continental shelf rights beyond 200 nautical miles: First, there was the 
perception that the acceptance of the concept of the EEZ, comprising living 
and non-living resources, was already a major gain for most coastal States.21 
Second, it was considered essential to create an “economically meaningful 
international area” with enough significant resources to be shared by all 
States,22 including those landlocked and geographically disadvantaged. Little 
point was seen in creating an international organization for seabed 
exploitation, which, according to the views of certain developing countries, 
was destined to become a major organization with perhaps thousands of 
employees if it did not have a substantial amount of resources to explore and 
exploit. Third, in light of the experience with the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, it was thought that the application of geological or 
geomorphological criteria in defining the outer limits of the continental shelf 
would not be as precise as a simple distance or depth criterion. 
The definition of the continental shelf now set forth in UNCLOS is once 
again a legal conception that differs significantly from the scientific 
definition.23 Article 76, paragraph 1, provides that the continental shelf 
comprises the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial sea of the coastal 
State “throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”—
                                                 
20. Baumert, supra note 15, at 833. 
21. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 844–45. 
22. Id. 
23. Bjorn Kunoy, Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: Is Crossing 
Boundaries Trespassing?, 26 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 313, 













even where no geological shelf exists.24 This represents a significant change 
from the provisions of the 1958 Convention.25 The outer edge of the 
continental margin is to be determined by two specific formulae—by outer 
limit points based on sediment thickness, the so-called Irish or Gardiner 
formula, or by a distance of not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot 
of the continental slope, the so-called Hedberg formula, together with the 
two restraints that are defined by a maximum distance of 350 nautical miles 
from the baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath.26 The 
opinion has been expressed it is unlikely that before the negotiations on what 
was to become Article 76 the legal continental shelf extended to the outer 
edge of the continental margin and that the ICJ in its 1969 judgment rather 
seemed to equate the geophysical continental shelf with the legal continental 
shelf.27 
It has been pointed out that Article 76 does not completely 
accommodate the views of the broad-shelf States as the detailed provisions 
on the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf may, in 
certain cases, result in an outer limit landward of the outer edge of the 
continental margin.28 This new definition of the continental shelf can 
nevertheless be considered a major success for these States as they succeeded 
in persuading the Conference that “submarine areas adjacent to the coast” 
include the entire continental margin.29 It has been estimated that the 
recognition of sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal States for these 
areas has “reduced” the geographical extent of the international seabed 
Area30 by some 30 million square kilometers.31 Thus, probably around 97 
                                                 
24. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(1). See also Kwiatkowska, supra note 19, at 154; Alex 
Oude Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC on the Definition of the Continental Shelf: Questions Concerning 
its Interpretation from a Legal Perspective, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND 
COASTAL LAW 269, 275 (2006). 
25. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 841. 
26. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(5). See also HELMUT TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, at 22 n.119 (2012). 
27. Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC, supra note 24, at 273–74. 
28. Id. at 274. See also UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 855–56. 
29. See also Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC, supra note 24, at 271–73. 
30. Defined as the “seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.” UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 1(1)(1). 
31. Michael W. Lodge, Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, 
Remarks at the Open Meeting of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: 
The Relevance and Importance of the Work of the Commission to the International Seabed 













percent of maritime hydrocarbon resources are now under national 
jurisdiction.32 
Experience has shown that the application of the two specific formulae 
contained in Article 76 for determining the outer edge of the continental 
margin is an often quite complicated, cost-intensive process requiring a high 
level of expert knowledge, a process that in some cases may take many 
years.33 It has been recognized that from a geological perspective, there are 
inherent difficulties in determining the thickness of sedimentary rocks and 
the foot of the continental slope.34 The comment has also been made that 
Article 76 reflects the state of scientific knowledge at the time of its 
elaboration and that subsequently gaps in that Article have been identified 
that introduce “a measure of subjectivity” into the process of the 
determination of the outer limit of the continental shelf.35 The outer edge of 
the continental margin may thus not always be as readily determined as had 
been contended at the Conference by some of the proponents of these two 
formulae.36 The author of the Irish formula, Tony Gardiner, repeatedly tried 
to convince delegates, including the author, that the practical application of 
his proposal would not cause particular difficulties. 
The issue as to whether the definition of the continental shelf contained 
in Article 76 applies only to States Parties to UNCLOS or also to non-parties 
was clearly decided by the ICJ in 2012 when it stated in the Nicaragua v. 
Colombia judgment that it considers the entirety of paragraph 1 of Article 76 
“part of customary international law.”37 There are good arguments to 
support paragraphs 2–7 of the Article, which provide the detailed rules that 
implement the continental margin criterion of paragraph 1, also being part 
of customary law, at least as far as the basic substantive rules contained 
                                                 
Presentations/6_CLCS_20_ANNIVERSARY_Lodge.pdf [hereinafter Lodge, Relevance 
and Importance of the Work]. 
32. Helmut Tuerk, The Landlocked States and the Law of the Sea, 40 REVUE BELGE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 91, 104–5 (2007). See also Kullenberg, supra note 12, at 850–51. 
33. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 878. 
34. Id. 
35. Informal comment by a member of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf at a session of the 2018 Global Ocean Regime Conference in Jeju-do, 
Republic of Korea, May 16–18. 
36. Helmut Tuerk, The Common Heritage of Mankind after 50 Years, 57 INDIAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259, 269 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40901-018-0085-8. 
37. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 













therein are concerned.38 The ICJ, in the aforementioned judgment, had 
determined that “it does not need to decide” whether the detailed provisions 
of Article 76 form part of customary international law.39 
The question may be asked whether States which are not party to 
UNCLOS may enjoy the benefits of Article 76 without having to comply 
with the connected obligations. Paragraphs 2–7 of Article 76 not only 
implement the continental margin criterion of paragraph 1, but they 
substantively alter it as well.40 In the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case, ITLOS 
confirmed that paragraph 1 of Article 76 “should be understood in light of 
the subsequent provisions of the Article defining the continental shelf and 
the continental margin,”41 namely paragraphs 2–7. It would hardly seem 
acceptable to States Parties if a State not a party to UNCLOS were to base 
its position exclusively on paragraph 1 of Article 76 and ignore the 
conditions and constraints imposed by the following paragraphs. In such a 
case, protests and non-recognition of these outer limit lines might well be 
the consequence.42 It can thus be concluded that the applicable law for 
determining the spatial extent of the continental shelf is the same for all 
coastal States, whether they are a party to UNCLOS or not.43 
The broad-shelf States had to make two compromises to have their 
views on their sovereign rights and jurisdiction extending to the outer edge 
of the continental margin accepted by the Conference. The most important 
one is the principle of revenue sharing enshrined in Article 82 UNCLOS.44 
It can well be said that there is an inextricable link between that Article and 
Article 76 as both provisions constitute an essential part of the “package 
deal” approach underlying UNCLOS.45 The second point is the requirement 
for coastal States under paragraph 8 of Article 76 to delineate the outer limits 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles “on the basis of” 
                                                 
38. See also Tullio Treves, Remarks on Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf in Response to Judge Marotta’s Report, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 363, 363 (2006). See also Baumert, supra note 15, at 853, 857.  
39. Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 37, at 666, ¶ 118. 
40. Baumert, supra note 15, at 848. 
41. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 437, ¶ 114. 
42. See also Baumert, supra note 15, at 855. 
43. Id. at 870. 
44. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 82.  
45. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 834–35. See also SUZETTE V. 
SUAREZ, THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THEIR 













recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS), so that these limits may become “final and binding.”46 
 
IV. THE DELIMITATION AND THE DELINEATION OF THE 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 
 
Any discussion of the delimitation and the delineation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles must begin with the landmark judgment in 
the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case.47 The most important aspect of the judgment 
by ITLOS, which can rightly be called historical,48 was its decision to proceed 
with the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
before recommendations had been made by the CLCS,49 an issue that 
previously had mostly been avoided by international courts and tribunals.50 
According to Article 76, paragraph 10, UNCLOS, the provisions of that 
Article are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the 
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. The 
Tribunal noted that because of the pending boundary dispute, the CLCS had 
deferred consideration of the submissions by Myanmar and Bangladesh in 
accordance with Article 76 and Article 9 of Annex 2 UNCLOS. It observed 
that a decision on its part not to exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute 
relating to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles would not only 
fail to resolve a longstanding dispute but also would not be conducive to the 
efficient operation of UNCLOS.51 In the view of the Tribunal, it would be 
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention not to resolve the 
existing impasse between the parties. Inaction by the CLCS and ITLOS, two 
organs created by UNCLOS that are complementary to each other so as to 
                                                 
46. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(8). 
47. See Gudmumdur Eriksson, The Bay of Bengal Case before the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE HUGO CAMINOS 512 (Lilian del Castillo 
ed., 2015). See also Shaun Lin & Clive Schofield, Lessons from the Bay of Bengal ITLOS Case: 
Stepping Offshore for a ‘Deeper’ Maritime Political Geography, 180 GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL 260 
(2014). 
48. See Ioannis Konstantinidis, Between Villa Schröder (ITLOS) and the Peace Palace (ICJ): 
Diverging Approaches to Continental Shelf Delimitation Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, 3 JOURNAL OF 
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME STUDIES, Summer-Fall 2016, at 28, 42 (2016). 
49. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 102, ¶ 391. 
50. Id. at 140 (declaration by Wolfrum, J.). 













ensure its coherent and efficient implementation, would leave the parties in 
a position where they might be unable to benefit fully from their rights over 
the continental shelf.52 
The underlying reasoning of the Tribunal has been the following: if 
States Parties have been able to reach an agreement between themselves 
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, 
the CLCS sees no obstacle in considering the submissions under Article 76 
regarding the delineation of the outer limits since there is no longer a dispute. 
If an international court or tribunal decides the delimitation between States 
Parties for that area of the continental shelf, the CLCS will find itself in a 
similar position, as the dispute has been resolved. 
ITLOS also emphasized that there is a clear distinction between the 
delimitation of the continental shelf under Article 83 and the delineation of 
its outer limits under Article 76. The exercise of its jurisdiction can, 
therefore, not be seen as an encroachment on the functions of the CLCS. 
The Tribunal concluded that to fulfill its responsibilities under the dispute 
settlement provisions of Part XV, Section 2, UNCLOS,53 it had an obligation 
to adjudicate the dispute and to delimit the continental shelf between the 
parties beyond 200 nautical miles—without prejudice to the establishment 
of the outer limits of the continental shelf under Article 76, paragraph 8.54 
To proceed to delimitation, ITLOS first had to determine whether the 
parties had overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles.55 It considered the meaning of “natural prolongation” and its 
interrelationship with that of the “outer edge of the continental margin” in 
the application of Article 76, notions closely related and referring to the same 
area.56 Entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles should 
thus be determined by reference to the outer edge of the continental margin 
to be ascertained in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 4.57 It has been 
remarked that by refraining from accepting the idea of natural prolongation 
based on geological and related factors, ITLOS missed a chance to clarify 
whether and to what extent geological and geomorphological factors should 
                                                 
52. Id. at 120, ¶ 392. 
53. UNCLOS, supra note 2, pt. XV, § 2.  
54. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 102–3, ¶¶ 393, 394. 
55. Id. at 105, ¶ 397. 
56. Id. at 113, ¶ 434. 













play a role in the determination of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles.58 
In its judgment, ITLOS also noted that the Bay of Bengal presented a 
“unique situation” and was satisfied that there was a continuous and 
substantial layer of sedimentary rocks extending from Myanmar’s coast to 
the area beyond 200 nautical miles.59 It concluded that both Bangladesh and 
Myanmar had an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
based on the thickness of sedimentary rocks according to the formula 
contained in Article 76, paragraph 4 (a)(i);60 the geographic origin of such 
sediments being not relevant. It further observed that it was also clear from 
the submissions of both parties to the CLCS that those entitlements 
overlap.61 In this connection, the comment has been made that if the origin 
of the sedimentary rocks of a relevant continental shelf were a consideration, 
then Nepal and China might have as much claim to the seabed of the Bay of 
Bengal as the riparian States.62 
Overlapping entitlements are a precondition for a court or tribunal to 
delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The ICJ, in its 2012 
judgment in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, rejected the request by Nicaragua 
for delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as 
Nicaragua had not followed the procedures prescribed by Article 76, 
paragraph 4—it had only submitted “Preliminary Information” to the 
CLCS—and did not prove that its continental margin extended sufficiently 
to overlap with the 200 nautical miles continental shelf to which Colombia 
is entitled.63 Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stated in its 
preamble, the Court held that the fact that Colombia is not a party did not 
relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76.64 As regards a clear 
distinction between the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
delineation of its outer limits, the Court concurred with the jurisprudence of 
ITLOS.65 
                                                 
58. Yao Huang & Xuexia Liao, Natural Prolongation and Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
Beyond 200 nm: Implications of the Bangladesh/Myanmar Case, 4 ASIAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 302 (2014). 
59. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 115, ¶ 444. 
60. Id. at 115, ¶ 445. 
61. Id. at 115, ¶¶ 444–45. 
62. Huang & Liao, supra note 58. 
63. Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 37, at 668, ¶ 124. 
64. Id. at 48–49, ¶¶ 126–29. 













In the Bangladesh v. India case,66 there was no question for the Arbitral 
Tribunal in its 2014 award, nor for the Special Chamber of ITLOS in its 
judgment of 2017 in the Ghana v. Cote d´Ivoire case67 that an overlapping 
entitlement existed, and delimitation could therefore be effected without 
prior delineation of the continental shelf based on a recommendation by the 
CLCS. With regard to Nicaragua’s request to delimit the boundary of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and that of the continental shelf 
of Colombia, the ICJ in its 2016 judgment also followed the jurisprudence 
of ITLOS in the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case. The Court considered that since 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles could be 
undertaken independently of a recommendation from the CLCS, the latter 
is not a prerequisite that needs to be satisfied by a State party to UNCLOS 
before it can ask the Court to settle a dispute with another State over such a 
delimitation.68 Support for the approach adopted by ITLOS has been 
reinforced and reiterated, thus endorsing its jurisprudence on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.69 
In delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar, ITLOS used the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances method, which in recent years has become the preferred 
method used by international courts and tribunals to achieve an equitable 
solution as required by Article 83, paragraph 1, UNCLOS.70 The Tribunal 
indicated that the delimitation method employed for the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles should not differ from that within 200 nautical 
miles. The adjusted equidistance line delimiting both the EEZ and the 
continental shelf within 200 nautical miles would thus continue in the same 
                                                 
66. Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India), Award, 138–41, ¶¶ 
456–58 (UNCLOS Annex VII Arb. Trib. 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/ 
sendAttach/383. 
67. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment, Sept. 23, 2017. ITLOS 
Rep. 4, 131–42, ¶¶ 482–527 [hereinafter Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire]. 
68. Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and 
Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 100, 137, ¶ 114 (Mar. 17). See also 
Massimo Lando, Delimiting the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles at the International 
Court of Justice: The Nicaragua v. Colombia Case, 16 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 137 (2017). 
69. Konstantinidis, supra note 48, at 48. 













direction beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit of Bangladesh until it reached 
the area where the rights of third States (India in this case) may be affected.71 
This is a logical consequence of the fact that there is only one single 
continental shelf, which has also become uncontested jurisprudence.72 
If the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is 
not strictly based on an equidistance line, as in that case, this results in a so-
called “grey area” of overlapping rights and jurisdiction.73 The Tribunal 
decided that in the area beyond the EEZ of Bangladesh that is within the 
limits of Myanmar’s EEZ, the maritime boundary delimits the parties’ rights 
to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf but does not otherwise 
limit Myanmar’s rights with respect to the EEZ, notably as regards the 
superjacent waters. Each State must, therefore, exercise its rights and 
perform its duties with due regard to the rights and duties of the other in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.74 ITLOS also pointed 
out that there are many ways in which these States may ensure the discharge 
of their obligations in this respect, including the conclusion of specific 
agreements or the establishment of appropriate cooperative arrangements.75 
This was the first time that an international court or tribunal pronounced 
itself on the question of the “grey area.” A similar situation arose in the 
Bangladesh v. India Arbitration, resulting in three “grey areas” with 
overlapping continental shelf and EEZ rights, involving not only Bangladesh 
and India but also Myanmar.76 The solutions adopted by ITLOS and the 
Arbitral Tribunal may not be ideal, as they pose certain challenges to the 
States concerned. There can be no doubt that, whenever possible, a single 
boundary line delimiting both the seabed and the water column is 
preferable,77 which has also become general practice. Thus far, no 
cooperative agreements or arrangements have yet been concluded by the 
riparian States of the Bay of Bengal. It, however, seems that at least for now 
these “grey areas” are not a significant problem. A solution might be to turn 
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these relatively small areas into zones of joint development and 
management.78 
In this context it should also be borne in mind that the provisions of 
UNCLOS relating to the EEZ, on the one hand, and those concerning the 
continental shelf on the other were not harmonized as the broad-margin 
States endeavored to keep the regime of the continental shelf unaffected by 
the new concept of the EEZ. There is, therefore, no subordination one way 
or the other between the respective regimes. They exist side by side just as 
the continental shelf regime has from its very beginning coexisted with that 
of the high seas. In both the above-mentioned cases, the tribunals concerned 
refrained from commenting on any relative primacy in the “grey areas,” be 
it of the EEZ or the continental shelf.79 
International jurisprudence has thus amply clarified the relationship 
between delimitation and delineation for the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles. The term “delineation” seems to have first appeared in a 
proposal submitted at the Conference by the United States in 1975 in 
connection with the suggested establishment of a “Continental Shelf 
Boundary Commission,”80 which was to become the CLCS. Three important 
suggestions made in the course of the negotiations regarding such a 
commission were, however, not retained in UNCLOS: the participation of 
legal expertise in that body, the relationship between delineation of the 
continental shelf and the dispute settlement procedures, and the possibility 
for the International Seabed Authority (ISA/the Authority) to submit a 
continental shelf delineation to the commission for review.81 The reason 
seems to have been the endeavor of important coastal States to restrict the 
role of such a body to the consideration of scientific and technical aspects 
of delineation and to ensure further that a coastal State would not have to 
face an international authority in any scientific dispute—nor in legal 
proceedings. 
Although it is the coastal State that is entitled to establish the outer limits 
of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as already referred to, these 
limits, according to Article 76, paragraph 3, only become “final and binding” 
if adopted “on the basis of” recommendations by the CLCS.82 The coastal 
States concerned have to submit particulars of these outer limits to the CLCS 
                                                 
78. Mishra, supra note 76, at 36. 
79. Id. at 33. 
80. See also UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 848–49. 
81. Id. at 850. 












with supporting scientific and technical data. The expression “on the basis 
of” a recommendation represents a compromise between those States that 
had proposed the coastal State only needed to take recommendations by the 
CLCS “into account” when establishing the outer limits and those that had 
advocated strict adherence by States to them and thus had suggested “in 
accordance with.”83 The term “on the basis of,” suggested by the United 
States, allows the coastal State some, but perhaps not too much flexibility 
concerning the implementation of the recommendations of the CLCS.84 
As to the meaning of “final and binding,” it is obvious that this applies 
to the coastal State making the submission to the CLCS. The argument has 
been made that it does not apply to third States and the international 
community as neither of these groups is a party to the submission process.85 
In any case, other State parties—as well as the ISA—will also be bound by 
these outer limits except for those States which explicitly challenge them. 
The main reason for providing in UNCLOS definite limits for the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles was to provide for legal stability 
in contrast to the previously existing situation. The question is whether any 
State party could mount a challenge or whether individual legal interests 
would have to be shown, be it in respect of delimitation, high seas freedoms, 
or mining sites in the international seabed Area.86 This is, however, a matter 
to be considered in the framework of the dispute settlement procedures 
provided for in UNCLOS. Although directly affected by the delineation of 
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles by a coastal State, as 
mentioned above, no role in the proceedings has been given to the ISA.87 It 
has rightly been pointed out that it might have been sensible to provide for 
such a possibility in a contentious case, since an extensive continental shelf 
reduces the geographical extent of the international seabed Area, and, 
correspondingly, the scope of the activities of the Authority.88 
After having established the outer limits of the continental shelf, the 
coastal State, under Article 76, paragraph 9, is under an obligation to deposit 
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charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently 
describing the outer limits of its continental shelf to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. According to Article 84, the State is also obliged to 
show the outer limit lines of the continental shelf and the limits of 
delimitation on charts adequate for ascertaining their position, or, where 
appropriate, lists of geographical coordinates of points specifying the 
geodetic datum.89 The charts have to be given due publicity and copies 
deposited with the U.N. Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the 
ISA. The difference between the two provisions is that in the first instance 
it is the task of the UN Secretary-General to give due publicity to such 
information while in the second case it is the coastal State.90 
These provisions are intended to make available to the international 
community information on the outer limits of the continental shelf set by 
the coastal State.91 At what point in time would other States have the 
possibility to challenge these limits, for example, with the argument that the 
provisions of UNCLOS have not been correctly applied, that the limits have 
not been established “on the basis of” recommendations by the CLCS,92 or 
that they are based on insufficient or flawed scientific data?93 Appropriate 
points would seem to be, for instance, after the coastal State has enacted 
legislation setting the outer limits of the continental shelf or after the U.N. 
Secretary-General has given due publicity to the information received from 
the coastal State.94 Experience with the limits of other maritime zones set by 
coastal States has, however, shown that most members of the international 
community are quite reluctant to react to maritime boundaries established 
by other States when their immediate interests are not involved. There are 
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good reasons to assume that this attitude is basically no different concerning 
delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
Delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles has a 
direct bearing on the extent of the international seabed Area. This is also 
illustrated by Article 134, paragraph 4, UNCLOS, dealing with the scope of 
Part XI, which provides that nothing in that Article “affects the 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with 
Part VI.”95 It seems obvious, however, that the States Parties working 
collectively within the framework of the ISA entrusted with administering 
the common heritage of mankind, need to know where national jurisdiction 
ends, and the international seabed Area begins.96 Otherwise it would, for 
instance, not be possible to comply with Article 142 UNCLOS according to 
which activities in the Area with respect to resource deposits which lie across 
the limits of national jurisdiction are to be conducted with “due regard to 
the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose 
jurisdiction such deposits lie.”97 
At the Conference, the negotiators were led to believe that no more than 
thirty to thirty-five States would be able to claim an entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.98 At present, there are, however, 
indications that there will be up to eighty-five such States,99 with the 
consequence of further considerably diminishing the international seabed 
Area. Through the end of 2019, eighty-five submissions, including revised 
or partial revised submissions, have been made to the CLCS claiming such 
entitlements. It has been estimated that the total number of submissions by 
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coastal States will approach 120.100 There is the further question of those 
States that are not or not yet parties to UNCLOS and might also have claims 
to continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nautical miles.101 It would seem 
that nothing prohibits these States from making a submission to the CLCS. 
It would then be up to it, as an autonomous body, to decide whether to 
consider the submission.102 
The argument has been put forth that non-parties have not been 
excluded from the mandate of the CLCS because Article 76 refers exclusively 
to “coastal States,” as does Annex II UNCLOS except for the Article 2 
provisions relating to organizational matters of the CLCS.103 The term 
“coastal State” instead of “State party” in that context, as well as in other 
provisions of UNCLOS, has, however, most likely been employed to 
exclude landlocked States because even an implicit reference to them would 
not have made sense. Nevertheless, should a non-party file a submission 
with the CLCS, it might be wise for the Commission to consider it and 
appropriately apprise the Meeting of States Parties104 of the submission. In 
any case, if a non-party wishes to engage in such a course of action, it would 
not make sense from the point of view of the interests of the international 
community to prevent that State from doing so. It would also seem 
reasonable that in such a case the non-party would be asked to defray the 
costs of processing its application, the amount to be determined by the 
Meeting of States Parties. 
In the case of the EEZs, it is not very difficult to know the limits of 
national jurisdiction, at least for those States Parties that have declared such 
a zone. For continental shelves, however, the situation is more complex as 
relatively few of the States having continental shelves extending beyond 200 
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nautical miles have yet established the outer limits.105 As of May 1, 2020, the 
CLCS had adopted only thirty-five recommendations on the outer limits of 
the continental shelf106 and only eight States—Australia, France (concerning 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, New Caledonia, and the Kerguelen 
islands), Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Niue, Pakistan, and the Philippines—
have fulfilled their obligation under Article 84, paragraph 2, UNCLOS to 
deposit charts or lists of geographical coordinates with the Secretary-General 
of the ISA showing these limits.107 This is certainly not a very heartening 
record. The Secretary-General has therefore urged all coastal States to 
deposit the relevant information as soon as possible after the establishment 
of the outer limit lines of their continental shelf, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of UNCLOS.108 
Although the CLCS has made substantial progress in its work during the 
past years dealing with voluminous submissions of considerable complexity, 
it is still faced with an immense workload.109 The UNCLOS framers did not 
foresee this situation and thus not provided adequate structures for the 
CLCS and the work of its members.110 Whether it was wise not to include 
lawyers on the CLCS is another matter as legal issues are almost inevitably 
bound to arise in connection with the delineation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles. Given its current workload, it may take decades 
for the CLCS to make all the recommendations regarding the submissions 
by coastal States with respect to the outer limits of the continental shelf.  
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In cases where a coastal State disagrees with the recommendation of the 
CLCS, it has to make a revised or a new submission “within a reasonable 
time.”111 The question arises for how long such a procedure might continue 
if there is no agreement between the State concerned and the CLCS. 
Furthermore, where there are delimitation disputes between States—and 
there are quite a few—the final determination of the outer limits may be 
delayed for an indefinite period.112 
After more than a quarter of a century since the entry into force of 
UNCLOS, the boundary between national jurisdiction and the international 
seabed Area still remains largely undefined. It has rightly been commented 
that this is a very unsatisfactory situation, making it more difficult for States 
Parties, acting through the ISA, to organize and control activities in the 
Area.113 Furthermore, it creates uncertainty in the law of the sea that the 
UNCLOS framers had tried to avoid.114 Despite this unsatisfactory situation, 
it may nevertheless be assumed that the seabed and ocean floor beyond 
national jurisdiction cover some 50 percent of the world’s surface.115 
 
V. REVENUE SHARING UNDER ARTICLE 82 
 
In light of this perhaps somewhat pessimistic outlook as regards a definite 
global boundary of the international seabed Area, it should be pointed out 
that revenue sharing under Article 82 UNCLOS, which has been referred to 
as the “only direct incursion into ocean space within national jurisdiction,”116 
can be considered an extension of the principle of the common heritage of 
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mankind,117 although this view is not undisputed.118 In any case, the 
responsibilities of the ISA in this context are limited to the various aspects 
of revenue sharing. It has no power to set standards for the exploration or 
exploitation of an area within national jurisdiction. 
The idea that coastal States should make payments to the international 
community arising from the exploitation of the non-living resources of the 
continental shelf dates back to discussions in the U.N. Seabed Committee in 
1971 in connection with the endeavors to define its outer limits. A system 
of contributions to an international authority to be created would have 
applied to variously-defined maritime areas beyond the territorial sea with 
different percentage rates based on distance from its outer limit and for 
developing or developed countries. In the course of the Conference it 
became, however, increasingly clear that revenue sharing within 200 nautical 
miles would not find general agreement, despite a number of proposals to 
that effect. The same was true regarding the suggestion that the international 
authority to be created would have the power to take appropriate measures 
if a State failed to comply with its revenue-sharing obligations119—a proposal 
to which some States were opposed as soon as it was made. 
Article 82 UNCLOS in its present form thus represents a compromise 
between various national positions.120 Coastal States with a continental shelf 
extending beyond 200 nautical miles must make annual payments or 
contributions in kind when exploiting the non-living resources beyond that 
distance after the first five years of production at a site. The rate of payments 
or contributions will annually rise from 1 percent at the beginning to 7 
percent of the value or the volume of production at the site as of the twelfth 
year after the commencement of exploitation.121 A developing State which is 
a net importer of a mineral resource produced from its continental shelf is 
exempt from making such payments or contributions with respect to that 
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resource. Production does not, however, include resources used in 
connection with the exploitation. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the five-year grace period thought to be a 
reasonable time during which the operator would be able to recover 
development costs is probably somewhat too short given the enormous 
financial outlay required for deep-sea mining in great depths. When this 
provision was drafted, oil and gas wells were in much shallower water and 
closer to the shore than is the case today.122 The percentage of the 
contributions made by coastal States was a controversial issue at the 
Conference, with suggestions put forth during protracted negotiations 
ranging between 5 and 15 percent.123 When the matter was once again 
discussed in the responsible negotiating group, the author, as a delegate of 
Austria, suggested 7 percent as a compromise,124 which subsequently found 
its way into UNCLOS. The rationale for this relatively low figure was not to 
cause a disincentive for the exploitation of the seabed beyond 200 nautical 
miles.125 
Article 82 has been characterized as having “textual ambiguities and 
process gaps that can be expected to constrain implementation.”126 Indeed, 
Article 82 does not provide definitions for key terms used, such as “value,” 
“volume,” “site,” “payments,” and “contributions in kind.”127 At the 
Conference, the negotiators were, however, hesitant to suggest too much 
detail in order not to upset a complicated negotiating process. They were 
also aware they were legislating for an unknown point in time in the future 
and further believed that some issues were better left to Article 82’s 
implementation phase. Some of the terms used in that Article may be 
understood differently in States with a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles.128 The ISA Secretariat has, therefore, commissioned a comparative 
study to “help identify possible paths for a practical approach” and in 
developing the understanding of “terminological issues in realistic 
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settings.”129 A guide would certainly be highly useful to assist States with 
implementing the provisions of that Article.130 
In this context, the following comments are offered. It seems clear that 
the obligation to make payments or contributions in kind is that of the 
coastal State, not the producer. Producers might well also argue that they 
already provide benefits to the economy in the form of taxes, employment, 
and existing royalties; thus, it should not be incumbent upon them to bear 
the additional cost of meeting the State’s treaty obligation.131 If Article 82 
were interpreted otherwise, exploitation of the resources of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles might become unattractive compared to 
exploitation within that distance, defeating its entire purpose. A positive 
example is the New Zealand legislation that directs the Minister of Energy 
and Resources to consider New Zealand’s obligations under Article 82 in 
specifying the rate of royalties and provides that the government will make 
all payments under that provision.132 Norway, in contrast, has opted for a 
somewhat different system, alerting bidders that the licensee may be required 
to cover an expense under Article 82, the cost of which can be deducted 
under the petroleum taxation.133 Revenue sharing may be an issue in States 
with a federal system as regards the respective responsibilities of the national 
government and the constituent units. For instance, in Canada, a country 
that might be among the first to become subject to the Article 82 
obligation.134 
In the calculation of the “value . . . of production at the site,”135 the 
negotiating history of Article 82 suggests that reference to the “well-head 
value” is intended.136 With regard to the definition of “site,” it has been 
suggested that the most practical approach would likely be to leave this 
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determination to the State involved.137 As far as the “resources used in 
connection with the exploitation”138 are concerned, a correct interpretation 
of this expression would seem to restrict these to physical elements used in 
production and not to include financial or other resources required in the 
process.139 
The payments or contributions in kind by coastal States are to be made 
through the ISA, which is then to distribute them to “States Parties . . . on 
the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and 
needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the 
landlocked among them.”140 It is important to note that payments or 
contributions under that provision are to be made “through” the ISA and 
not “to” it as proposed in earlier drafts of the Article.141 This means that the 
Authority can be considered a trustee of the payments received until their 
distribution to the beneficiary States.142 These funds are distinct from any 
revenues collected by the ISA from deep-sea mining operations under Part 
XI UNCLOS and must be distributed.143 It would nevertheless seem 
reasonable to allow the Authority to recover administrative costs incurred in 
the processing of the payments received. There would seem to be little 
justification for using funds from its regular budget for such a purpose. 
Although it is for the coastal State to choose between payments and 
contributions in kind, the latter does not seem to be a very realistic option 
as this would put the ISA in the extremely difficult position of having to deal 
directly with seabed resources and oversee their distribution or marketing 
and subsequent sale.144 Contributing States should therefore be encouraged 
to discharge their obligation under Article 82 based solely on payments made 
in an internationally convertible currency.145 
UNCLOS provides no guidance on how and at what point in time the 
ISA is to become involved in the implementation of Article 82. It should be 
borne in mind that the Authority will have to discharge substantial 
responsibilities in this connection, requiring advanced planning and 
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preparations in order to be able to set up the necessary structures and 
processes for receiving payments.146 An unresolved question is the role of 
the ISA in the process of determining the value or volume of the resources 
and the amount of the payments or contributions. It may be considered a 
“gap” in UNCLOS that the ISA has not been expressly granted the 
monitoring function needed to carry out the specific tasks under Article 82 
in an efficient manner. Nevertheless, the entire process must, at the very 
least, be transparent to the States Parties147 as the payments constitute the 
discharge of a legal obligation owed to the international community. These 
payments can neither be considered charity nor development aid. The same 
requirement of transparency also applies to the question as to whether a 
particular developing country qualifies for the resource-specific exemption. 
An important task of the ISA will be to define “equitable sharing criteria” 
for the distribution of the payments received and to determine priorities 
among potential recipients. It seems those States that are at the same time 
least developed and landlocked would deserve to have priority.148 It will be 
for the ISA Council to recommend to the Assembly the necessary rules, 
regulations, and procedures on equitable sharing.149  
To discharge what has been described as its “fiduciary duty to mankind 
as a whole,”150 it is indispensable that there are consultation and agreement 
between a coastal State exploiting resources of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles and the ISA. A model agreement has been developed, 
perhaps with common provisions applicable to all such States and particular 
ones for each individual case.151 The focus of such agreements would be 
exclusively on those aspects of production that are “central to the respective 
responsibilities” under Article 82.152 Another possibility may be the 
conclusion of a memorandum of understanding,153 which, although having 
a different legal status than an agreement, might have the same practical 
effect. 
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It has rightly been pointed out that UNCLOS does not address how 
disputes regarding the interpretation and application of Article 82 should be 
resolved.154 Besides the difficult question of whether engaging in a 
contentious procedure would even be possible, the option of seeking an 
advisory opinion should be borne in mind. Under Article 191, the Assembly 
and the Council of the ISA are empowered to seek an advisory opinion from 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS on “legal questions arising within 
the scope of their activities.”155 It may be assumed that these activities 
include the tasks of the Authority under Article 82.156 The rules of procedure 
of ITLOS further provide for the possibility of rendering an advisory 
opinion by the full tribunal, if this is provided for by an international 
agreement related to the purposes of UNCLOS conferring jurisdiction on 
it.157 
The interpretation and application of Article 82 raise difficult questions 
that need to be further considered and resolved. The ISA has convened 
several workshops aimed at providing guidance for implementing the 
provisions of that Article. Many valuable suggestions were made at these, 
some of which have been taken up. There can, however, be no doubt that 




The definition of the continental shelf set forth in Article 76 UNCLOS has 
also become part of customary international law. Through their 
jurisprudence, international courts and tribunals have clarified important 
issues concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. These 
relate, in particular, to the concept of a “single” continental shelf and to the 
possibility of its binding delimitation between adjacent or opposite coastal 
States—in the absence of a recommendation by the CLCS regarding the 
delineation of its outer limits. The potential problems that may arise from 
areas of overlap between a State’s continental shelf and EEZ rights of 
another State, resulting in so-called “grey areas,” are a matter to which the 
negotiators at the Conference obviously did not devote sufficient attention. 
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The heavy workload, besides great responsibility, imposed by the 
Convention on the members of the CLCS was also completely 
underestimated at the time of its elaboration. The result is that the precise 
extent of the international seabed Area—the common heritage of 
mankind—will at least not be known for a very long time. This may also, to 
a certain extent, affect the work of the ISA. With regard to revenue sharing 
under Article 82 UNCLOS, the hope seems justified that this provision will 
become operational in a foreseeable future. Its implementation, however, 
still requires further in-depth consideration of, in particular, the role of the 
ISA in the process of determining the value or volume of resources and the 
amount of payments to be made by the coastal States concerned. 
